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The U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases involving the 
Ex Post Facto Clause during its most recent term. One 
case, Carmell v. Texas, 120 S.Ct. 1620 (2000), addressed 
an issue long undecided. In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
adopted an expansive interpretation of the Clause. The 
case is also noteworthy because the usual factions on the 
Court were ruptured by this opinion- with Justice Scalia 
and Thomas joining the majority and Justice Rehnquist in 
dissent. In addition, ex post facto issues have arisen recent-
ly as new legislation concerning sexual predator and DNA 
databank statutes has swept through the country. 
This article examines the Ex Post Facto Clause and the 
Ohio counterparts. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The U.S. Constitution prohibits the ex post facto applica-
tion of criminal laws. See 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive 
Criminal Law§ 2.4 (1986). Article I, § 9, clause 3 provides 
that Congress shall not pass any "ex post facto Law." 
Another provision, Article I,§ 10, is directed to the States: 
"No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto 
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts:' 
Calder v. Bull 
In one of its earliest criminal procedure decisions, Calder 
v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798), the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause. After noting 
that the term "ex post facto" was a term of art with an estab-
lished meaning, the Court set forth the contours of this pro-
hibition: 
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when 
done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every 
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it 
was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts greater punishment, than the 
law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every 
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives 
less, or different testimony, than the law required at the 
time of the commission of the offense, in order to con-
vict the offender. 
Although the Calder formulation indicates that there are four 
aspects to the Clause, these can be combined into three 
because the second aspect- aggravation of a crime -can 
be considered an increase in punishment. 
Subsequent cases set out further principles. First, the 
law must be retroactive, "that is, it must apply to events oc-
curring before its enactment," and the law "must disadvan-
tage the offender affected by it." Weaver v. Graham, 450 
U.S. 24, 29 (1 981 ). Second, the Clause applies only to leg-
islation, not judicial opinions. The Supreme Court, however, 
has recognized a due process principle in this context, a 
subject discussed later in this article. Third, "[a]lthough the 
Latin phrase 'ex post facto' literally encompasses any law 
passed 'after the fact,' it has long been recognized by this 
[Supreme] Court that the constitutional prohibition on ex 
post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disad-
vantage the offender affected by them." Collins v. 
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,41 (1990). This limitation, restrict-
ing the Clause to penal statutes, plays a significant role in 
the sexual predator and DNA databank cases. 
OHIO LAW 
Ohio Constitution 
Article II, § 28 of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the 
General Assembly from enacting "retroactive" laws. Ohio 
cases often cite this provision along with the federal Ex Post 
Facto Clause. For example, in State v. Sargent, 126 Ohio 
App.3d 557, 566, 710 N.E.2d 1170 (1 998), the court of ap-
peals wrote that the "Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the 
states from passing laws that inflict punishment upon a per-
son for an act which was innocent when it was committed, 
aggravate a crime or make it greater than when it was com-
mitted, or change the punishment or inflict a greater punish-
ment than was provided when the crime was committed. 
Section 1 0, Article I, United States Constitution; Section 28, 
Article II, Ohio Constitution." 
In applying the Retroactivity Clause, courts must deter-
mine whether statutes are "substantive or remedial in their 
operation on preexisting rights." State v. Hawkins, 87 Ohio 
St.3d 311, 314, 720 N.E.2d 521 (1999); State v. Dowen, 93 
Ohio Misc.2d 23, 25-26, 702 N.E.2d 164, 165 (C.P. 1 997) 
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("Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution bans retroac-
tive laws that affect substantive rights .... The Franklin 
County Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute before it, concluding that the new statute does not 
impose penalties for past OMVI violations, but rather serves 
notice for future violations."). 
Revised Code 1.48 
R.C. 1.48 effectuates the constitutional provision by pro-
viding that a "statute is presumed to be prospective in its op-
. eration unless expressly made retrospective." See State v. 
Hawkins, 87 Ohio St.3d 311, 314, 720 N.E.2d 521 
(1999)("R.C. 1.48 and Section 28, Article II serve to guard 
against the unjustness of retrospective legislation."). 
These provisions are more expansive than the federal 
counterpart. The prosecution can also cite them. State v. 
Hawkins, 87 Ohio St.3d 311, 720 N.E.2d 521 (1999), illus-
trates this point. Hawkins was indicted for felonious assault 
on August 4, 1976. At that time, the maximum prison term 
was 15 years. Hawkins was found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity and was committed to Lima State Hospital. During 
the next 20 years, Hawkins underwent periodic reviews, all 
of which resulted in his continued commitment. Under the 
extant law, a defendant could remain committed indefinitely. 
However, R.C. 2945.401, which became effective in July 1, 
1997, provided that defendants could be committed until the 
expiration of the maximum prison term that could have been 
imposed if convicted of the most serious offense. 
At Hawkins' recommitment hearing on September 2, 
1997, his attorney moved to have him discharged on the 
basis of R.C. 2945.401. Since the maximum prison term 
Hawkins could have received was 15 years and he had al-
ready been committed for over 20 years, his attorney ar-
gued thatthe trial court could not continue to order 
Hawkins' commitment. The trial court disagreed and or-
dered continued commitment. 
The court of appeals reversed, rejecting the state's argu-
ment that application of R.C. 2945.401 to a person found 
not guilty by reason of insanity prior to the statute's July 1, 
1997 effective date was a retrospective application of law in 
violation of Article II § 28 of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 
1.48. In the courts' view, the provisions of the statute did 
not turn on the time a defendant was adjudicated not guilty 
by reason of insanity, but turned instead on the time that 
post-adjudication commitment hearings were conducted. 
The court also stated that the provisions of R.C. 2945.401 
"do not change any determinations about guilt, innocence, 
or commitment made prior to July 1, 1997. Nor do they take 
away any vested rights, create any new obligations, impose 
any new duties, or attach any new disabilities with respect 
to the 1976 offense with which the defendant was charged." 
87 Ohio St.3d at 312. 
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Th13 Court found that 
the case involved a "straightforward application" of the 
statute, since Hawkins' September 2, 1997 recommitment 
hearing occurred after the July 1 , 1997 effective date of the 
statute. ld. at 314. The statue was prospective in nature 
and therefore not affected by Ohio's ex post facto laws, 
which guard against retrospective legislation. The Court re-
lied in part on State v. Jackson, 2 Ohio App.3d 11, 440 N.E. 
2d 1199 (1981 ), in which a similar statute was upheld by the 
court of appeals. In that case, the court found that since the 
defendant was not being punished for a crime, but was in-
stead being treated for an illness, the legislation was not ex 
post facto. In addition, the court in Jackson found that the 
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provisions in question were "prospective in nature, since 
they are intended to govern treatment and discharge proce-
dures after the law's effective date. The new provisions of 
the law do not take away any vested rights and do not at-
tach any new obligations." ld. at 13-14. 
NEW CRIMES OR DEFENSES 
The most basic prohibition recognized by the Ex Post 
Facto Clause is the creation of retroactive crimes. For ex-
ample, in City of Gahanna v. Jones-Williams, 117 Ohio 
App.3d 399, 404, 690 N.E.2d 928 (1997), the court of ap-
peals wrote: "[l]t is clear that Ordinance 86~94 made the 
failure to file a return criminal, and such action was not crim-
inal under the version of Gahanna Section 161.16 that was 
in effect as of Apri! 15, 1993." 
Defenses 
The prohibition on new crimes also applies to the retroac-
tive application of statutes that limit defenses. A law that 
"deprives one charged with crime of any defense available 
according to law at the time when tre act was committed, is 
prohibited as ex post facto." Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 
169 (1925). See also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 
(1990)(The "Beaze//formulation is faithful to our best knowl-
edge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the defini-
tion of crimes or increase the punishment of criminal acts."); 
State v. Rush, 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 59, 697 N.E.2d 634 (1998) 
("Legislation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it ... de-
prives the accused of a defense available at the time the 
crime was committed."). 
This principle is merely a recognition that there are sever-
al ways in which a crime may be redefined, one is eliminat-
ing an element from the definition of the crime and another 
is limiting a defense. State v. Luff, 85 Ohio App.3d 785, 793, 
621 N.E.2d 493 (1993), appeal dismissed, 67 Ohio St.3d 
1464,619 N.E.2d 698 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1136 
(1994), illustrates this rule. It concerned the change in the 
Ohio definition of insanity, an affirmative defense. "Because 
R.C. 2901.01 (N) significantly changed the evidentiary stan-
dard of insanity, the court's retrospective application of R.C. 
2901.01 (N) deprived Luff of a defense that was available to 
him according to the law at the time the crimes were com-
mitted." 
INCREASED PUNISHMENT 
The Calder decision recognized a second way in which 
the Clause may be violated - a retroactive increase in pun-
ishment. More recent decisions reaffirm this principle. 
"Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of 
crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts." Collins 
v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990). See also State v. 
Rush, 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 59, 697 N.E.2d 634 (1998) 
("Legislation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it ... in-
creases the punishment for a crime after its commission 
.... "); City of Gahanna v. Jones-Williams, 117 Ohio App.3d 
399, 404, 690 N.E.2d 928 (1997)("0rdinance 86-94 in-
creased the punishment by increasing the fine for a first of-
fense, and by arguably permitting jail time for a first of-
fense."); State v. Gleason, 110 Ohio App.3d 240, 246, 673 
N.E.2d 985 (1996) ("Because a violation of the dissemina-
tion statute in 1984 and 1985 under the facts and circum-
stances of this case would have resulted in a minimum term 
of imprisonment of six months, and because application of 
the statute's current provisions resulted in a minimum term 
of imprisonment of one year, the trial court erred in applying 
the current classifications .... "); State v. Hartup, 126 Ohio 
App.3d 768, 770, 711 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1998) ('The court 
found ... (2} as applied to offenses committed prior to its ef-
fective date, R.C. 2953.36 '[made] the punishment for a cer-
tain class of crimes more burdensome, after their commis-
sion, and thus is an impermissible ex post fact law, in viola-
tion of Art. I, § 10, of the United States Constitution."'). 
The cases examining increased punishment involve a 
myriad of diverse issues - from the elimination of good time 
credit to the extension of parole hearing intervals. 
Mandatory Sentencing 
In Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937), the 
defendants were sentenced under a law requiring a sen-
tence of 15 years, while the law in effect at the time of the 
offense gave the judge discretion to impose a lesser sen-
tence. The Court struck down the conviction, commenting: 
[T]he ex post facto clause looks to the standard of pun-
ishment prescribed by a statute, rather than to the sen-
tence actually imposed. . .. Removal of the possibility of a 
sentence of less than fifteen years, at the end of which 
petitioners would be freed from further confinement and 
the tutelage of a parole revocable at will, operates to their 
detriment in the sense that the standard of punishment 
adopted by the new statute is more onerous than that of 
the old. 
Good-Time Credit 
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981 ), involved in-
mates whose good-time credit was legislatively reduced 
across the board, even if they had not violated any prison 
regulation. The Court ruled that the elimination of good 
time-credit constituted an increase in punishment because 
"a prisoner's eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a signifi-
cant factor entering into both the defendant's decision to 
plea bargain and the judge's calculation of the sentence to 
be imposed." 
Statutory Guidelines 
In Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987}, the defendant 
was convicted of sexual battery. At the time the crime was 
committed, Florida's sentencing guidelines required a pre-
sumptive sentence of 3 to 4 years imprisonment. Revised 
guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing called for a pre-
sumptive sentence of 5 to 7 years imprisonment. The trial 
court applied the revised guidelines, imposing a seven-year 
sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, finding application 
of the revised sentencing guidelines constitutionally defec-
tive. The guidelines were imposed retrospectively, they dis-
advantaged the defendant by subjecting him to the possibili-
ty of increased punishment, and they could not be charac-
terized as "procedural." 
Frequency of Parole Hearings 
In California Department of Corrections v. Morales, !?14 
U.S. 499 (1995), the Court held that a statutory amendment 
that permitted the Board of Prison Terms to decrease the 
frequency of parole suitability hearings under certain condi-
tions did not violate the ex post facto prohibition. The 
California statute in question was amended after Morales' 
conviction to allow parole boards to defer suitability hearings 
for three years for individuals convicted of more than one of-
fense involving the taking of a life. Previously, prisoners 
were allowed annual suitability hearings. Morales argued 
that such a law made parole less accessible, thus making 
his sentence longer in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
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Justice Thomas wrote that the statute did nothing to af-
fect Morales' indeterminate sentence (15 to life), and it did 
not alter the "substantive formula for securing any reduc-
tions to the sentencing range." Jd. at 507. The statutory 
amendment simply altered the method for fixing a parole re-
lease date so that the parole board would not have to hold 
another hearing in the year or two after the initial hearing. 
The Court emphasized that it had long refused to articulate 
any particular formula for measuring when legislative adjust-
ments are of "sufficient moment" to transgress the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. This case did not require such an articulation 
because the amended statute's chance for increasing the 
measure of punishment was far too "speculative and attenu-
ated." 
As the Court pointed out, the amended statute only af-
fected those who had been convicted of crimes involving 
loss of life more than once. Morales killed his wife while on 
parole for a prior murder conviction. The early release of 
prisoners for this class of crime is highly unlikely. In addi- . 
tion, "it affects the timing only of subsequent hearings. 
Moreover, the Board has the authority to tailor the frequency 
of subsequent hearings." ld. at 511. 
This term, in Garner v. Jones, 120 S.Ct. 1362 (2000), the 
Court once again confronted this issue. The question be-
fore the Court was whether the retroactive application of a 
Georgia law permitting the extension of intervals between 
parole considerations violated the Clause. In 197 4 respon-
dent began serving a life sentence. He escaped five years 
later and committed another murder. Apprehended and 
convicted in 1982, he was sentenced to a second life term. 
At the time of respondent's second conviction, the Parole 
Board was required to consider parole after three years. In 
1985, the rules were amended to require reconsideration 
every eight years. The board reinstated its earlier three-
year rule and considered respondent for parole in 1992 and 
1995. He was denied both times. In 1995, the Board re-
sumed scheduling parole reconsiderations at least every 
eight years, and so at respondent's 1995 review it set the 
next consideration for 2003. The Board's policy permits the 
inmates to show a change in their individual circumstances, 
which could expedite reconsideration for parole. 
On review, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: 'The 
States must have due flexibility in formulating parole proce-
dures and addressing problems associated with confine-
ment and release." ld. at 1368. "The idea of discretion is 
that it has the capacity, and the obligation, to change and 
adapt based on experience." ld. at 1369. 'The Board's stat-
ed policy is to provide for reconsideration at 8-year intervals 
'when, in the Board's determination, it is not reasonable to 
expect that parole would be granted during the intervening 
years." ld. at 1369-70. Thus, the State's new policy did not 
act to increase respondent's punishment for the crime he 
committed prior to the enactment of the new policy. 
Early Release Provisions 
In Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997}, the Supreme 
Court considered an ex post facto claim arising from the 
retroactive cancellation of a prisoner's provisional early re-
lease credits, which had been awarded to alleviate prison 
overcrowding. In 1983, the Florida Legislature established 
the early release program, and Lynce was released in 1992. 
Subsequently, the state Attorney General interpreted a 1992 
statute as canceling retroactively credits for those who had 
committed murder or attempted murder. Because Lynce fell 
into this category, he was rearrested and returned to prison. 
The Supreme Court ruled that this action violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause. The Clause is violated when the state 
increases punishment for an offense after it has been com-
mitted. The Court stated that the motivation of the legisla-
ture was irrelevant. For the Court, the critical issue was the 
effect of the legislation - here, the cancellation of 1 ,869 
days of accumulated provisional credits lengthened the peti-
tioner's incarceration. "[R]etroactive alteration of parole or 
early release provisions, like the retroactive application of 
provisions that govern initial sentencing, implicates the Ex 
Post Facto Clause because such credits are 'one determi-
nant of petitioner's prison term ... and ... [the petitioner's] ef-
fective sentence is altered once this determinant is 
changed." ld. at 445 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 
24, 32 (1981)). 
The Court distinguished a prior case, Morales. "Unlike 
the California amendment at issue in Morales, the 1 992 
Florida statute did more than simply remove a mechanism 
that created an opportunity for early release for a class of 
prisoners whose release was unlikely; rather, it made ineligi-
ble for early release a class of prisoners who were previous-
ly eligible- including some, like petitioner, who had actually 
been released." ld. at 447. 
Recidivist Statutes 
State v. Sargent, 126 Ohio App.3d 557, 566, 710 N.E.2d 
1170 (1 998), involved a recidivist enhancement scheme, 
which increased punishment for second offenders. The 
court of appeals wrote that "[s]tatutes which enhance the 
penalty for repeat offenders based in part upon criminal 
conduct occurring prior to passage of the enhancement pro-
vision do not constitute ex post facto legislation. The en-
hancement provisions do not punish the past conduct; 
rather; the enhancement provisions merely increase the 
severity of a penalty imposed for criminal behavior that oc-
curs after passage of the enhancement legislation." 
Expungement Statutes 
In State v. Hartup, 126 Ohio App.3d 768, 772, 711 N.E.2d 
315, 318 (1998), the court of appeals considered the ex 
post facto implications of a retroactive change in an ex-
pungement statute: "That the General Assembly saw fit to 
remove the 'privilege' of seeking expungement from certain 
offenders does not equate to increasing the punishment for 
the offense. On its most basic level, R.C. 2953.36 does not 
increase any 'punishment' for the offense of gross sexual 
imposition .... It merely removes the possibility of having a 
record of conviction sealed .... Because R.C. 2953.36 does 
not impose greater punishment, it does not violate the ex 
post facto clause of the United States Constitution." 
Ohio Sentencing Guidelines 
Several retroactivity issues arose with the enactment of 
the new sentencing law. In State v. Rush, 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 
697N.E.2d 634 (1 998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1052 (1 999), 
the Ohio Supreme Court examined some of them. Rush 
pled guilty to one count of aggravated trafficking for selling 
cocaine. The alleged offense occurred on September 15, 
1 995, but Rush was sentenced after July 1, 1 996, the effec-
tive date of Senate Bill 2. The trial court overruled Rush's 
motion to be sentenced in accordance with Senate Bill 2 
and sentenced him to 3 to 15 years under the laws in place 
when the offense was committed. Senate Bill 2 provided for 
1 to 5 years. 
Unlike the other cases discussed in this article, the new 
law favored the defendant in this situation, and R.C. 1.58 
provides that when penalties are reduced before sentencing 
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has occurred, penalties should be imposed in accordance 
with the amended statute. However, Senate Bill 2 specified 
that it did not apply to people not yet sentenced, as long as 
the offense occurred prior to the statute's effective date. 
The court of appeals found a conflict between R.C. 1.58 and 
Senate Bill 2. In construing the statutes strictly against the 
State and liberally in favor of Rush, the court held that Rush 
should be sentenced in accordance with Senate Bill 2. 
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, finding that Senate 
Bill 2 did not apply to this category of offenders because the 
General Assembly specifically provided that the statute ap-
plied only to offenses committed after the effective date. 
lhe Court rejected the defendant's reliance on R.C. 1.58, 
stating that the statute "does not create a vested right to be 
sentenced according to amended laws: it is a general rule of 
statutory construction." ld. at 56. The Court held that the 
"notwithstanding" language in Senate Bill 2, in effect ex-
empting the application of R.C. 1.58, was permissible. The 
Court stated, "It is"the General Assembly, of course, that 
possesses authority to determine the effective dates of en-
actments passed pursuant to its legislative powers." ld. at 
57. 
The Court also held that Senate Bill 2 did not violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution or the Ohio 
Constitution's ban against retroactive laws, since it did not 
increase punishment. In addition, the Court ruled that a law 
is not retroactive unless the legislature so specifies, and in 
this case, the General Assembly clearly stated that the law 
would be prospective- applying only to acts occurring after 
July 1, 1 996. 
CHANGES IN EVIDENCE RULES 
Calder specified that changes in the law of evidence may 
also violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. In a later case, the 
Supreme Court indicated that a statute that required "less 
proof, in amount or degree" would violate the Clause. 
Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 385 (1898). In con-
trast, in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), the Court held 
that a statute that enlarged the class of witnesses who 
could testify did not violate the Clause because the new rule 
applied to defense as well as to prosecution witnesses. 
Similarly, in Thompson the Court ruled that the retroactive 
application of a statute making handwritten documents ad-
missible as handwriting exemplars did not violate the 
Clause. 171 U.S. at 386-87. 
This term in Carmell v. Texas, 120 S.Ct. 1620 (2000), the 
Supreme Court addressed this subject for the first time in 
many years. Priorto September 1, 1993, a Texas statute re-
quired one of three types of support for testimony by victims 
in certain sex crimes prosecutions - indecency with a 
child, sexual assault, and aggravated sexual assault. These 
included: (1) corroboration by other evidence, (2) corrobo-
ration by someone whom the witness informed within six 
months of the offense (a type of "fresh complaint" rule), or 
(3) the testimony alone, even without corroboration or fresh 
complaint, if the victim was younger than 14 at the time of 
the offense. Effective September 1, 1993, the statute was 
amended. The new statute included the same three re-
quirements, but the age for the victim in the third category 
was changed to under 18. 
Carmell was convicted of 15 counts of sexual offenses 
against his stepdaughter. He appealed four of his convic-
tions, which involved conduct prior to September 1, 1993, 
during which time the victim was older than 14. Carmell ar-
gued that application of the new statute violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. Under the old statute, the victim's testimony 
would require corroboration. A Texas appellate court found 
against Carmell, ruling that the statute was procedural and 
did not increase the punishment nor change the elements of 
the offense. 
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion delivered by 
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, 
Thomas, and Breyer. The Court determined that the statute 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it "alters the 
legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testi-
mony, than the law required at the time of the commission of 
the offence, in order to convict the offender." ld. at 1627 
(quoting Calder). Texas relied on Hopt, in which the retroac-
tive application of a witness competency provision was up-
held as constitutional. Texas argued that the statute in 
Carmell's case was likewise a witness-competency rule that 
did not affect the definition of the crime, its punishment, or 
the sufficiency of the evidence required to convict. The 
Court rejected this argument, ruling that the statute was not 
a mere witness-competency provision but was instead a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence rule. The language in the Texas 
statute stated that "[a] conviction ... is supportable on," 
whereas the language in Hopt referred to "determining the 
competency of wltnesses."11 0 U.S. at 587-88. 
Consequently, the Texas statute did not "simply enlarge the 
class of persons who may be competent to testify," nor did it 
"only remove existing restrictions upon the competency of 
certain classes of persons as witnesses:' ld. at 589-90. 
In reversing, the Supreme Court quoted from Joseph 
Story's comments on the Ex Post Facto Clause: 
If the laws in being do not punish an offender, let him go 
unpunished; let the legislature, admonished of the defect 
of the laws, provide against the commission of future 
crimes of the same sort. The escape of one delinquent 
can never produce so much harm to the community, as 
may arise from the infraction of a rule, upon which the 
purity of public justice, and the existence of civil liberty, 
essentially depend. Commentaries on the Constitution § 
1338, at 211 n.2. 
CHANGES IN PROCEDURE 
Calder did not specify that retroactive changes in "crimi-
nal procedure" as opposed to "evidence" were covered by 
the Clause. See Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-83 
(1894) (depriving an accused of "substantial protections 
with which the existing law surround the person accused of 
crime are not considered within the constitutional inhibi-
tion"). The Supreme Court, however, held in later cases 
that certain changes in criminal procedure violated the 
Clause- procedural changes that deprive the defendant of 
a substantial right. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 
(1925) (A procedural change may constitute an ex post 
facto violation if it "affected matters of substance"). 
In Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), the prior law 
provided that a plea of guilty to second degree murder re-
sults in an automatic acquittal to first degree murder even if 
the plea was later set aside. After Kring's offense, a new 
law provided that if the plea is later set aside the defendant 
could be tried for first degree murder. The Court found an 
ex post facto violation because the new law deprived the ac-
cused of a substantial right. Similarly, in Thompson v. Utah, 
170 U.S. 343 (1898), the Court ruled that the retroactive re-
duction of the number of jurors from 12 to 8 denied 
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Thompson of a substantial right. 
Other cases found certain procedural changes not viola-
tive of the Clause. For example, in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 
167 (1925), the prior law provided for separate trials of joint-
ly indicted defendants as a matter of right. After the offense 
was committed, the law was changed to make severance a 
matter of judicial discretion. This was not considered a vio-
lation because it was not a substantial right. 
The Court, however, eventually changed directions. In 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), a new law al-
lowed the reformation of an improper jury verdict. The jury 
imposed a fine in addition to lite imprisonment in 
Youngblood's case. The fine was not authorized, and under 
Texas procedure the judgment was voided and a new trial 
required. The new law permitted an appellate court to re-
form an improper verdict that assessed a punishment not 
authorized by law. Applying this provision, the state appel-
late court ordered the deletion of the fine but denied the re-
quest for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed Kring 
and Thompson, holding that the historical purpose of the 
Clause did not extend to procedural changes. ''The Beaze/1 
formulation is faithful to our best knowledge of the original 
understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause: Legislatures 
may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or in-
crease the punishment of criminal acts." I d. at 43. 
Moreover, the Court found the phrase "substantial protec-
tions" had "imported confusion" into the interpretation of the 
Clause that was not justified by the historical record. ld. at 
45. The Court also noted that "by simply labeling a law 'pro-
cedural,' a legislature does not thereby immunize it from 
scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause." ld. at 46. 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to the legislative 
branch. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 
(1977) ("The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the 
powers of the legislature, and does not of its own force 
apply to the judicial branch of government. But the principle 
on which the Clause is based - the notion that persons 
have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give 
rise to criminal penalties - is fundamental to our concept of 
constitutional liberty. As such, that right is protected against 
judicial action by the Due Process Clause .... ") (citations 
omitted). 
The Supreme Court held in Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 
34 7, 353-54 ( 1964), that the retroactive application of judi-
cial decisions that significantly change prior law may violate 
due process: 
[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal 
statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex 
post facto law . . . . If a state legislature is barred by the Ex 
Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow 
that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process 
Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judi-
cial construction. 
The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized this principle in 
several cases. E.g., State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 57-
58, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995) (principle not applicable in this 
case; not a new rule); State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 330 
n. 1, 638 N. E.2d 1023 (1994 ). Citing Bouie, the Court in 
State v. Saylor, 6 Ohio St.2d 139, 141,216 N.E.2d 622 
(1966), wrote: "It has been suggested that the requirement 
of mens rea is not in the statute; but, even so, any attempt 
at this time to eliminate the mens rea requirement would 
confront serious due process objections."). 
SEXUAL PREDATOR STATUTES 
Ohio has had a sex offender registration statute since 
1963, but the General Assembly rewrote the statute in 1996. 
The 1996 revision included three classifications for offend-
ers: sexually oriented offender, habitual sex offender, and 
sexual predator. These classifications became effective 
January 1, 1997. An offender is automatically classified as 
a sexual predator if convicted of violent sexually-oriented 
offense and a sexual-predator specification was included in 
the indictment. Otherwise, a person can be classified as a 
sexual predator by the trial court, after a hearing. The hear-
ing takes place at or before sentencing. 
The 1996 version of the law also included a new registra-
tion provision, which became effective July 1, 1997. 
Offenders are to register with their county sheriff, providing 
a home address, the name and address of employer, a pho-
tograph, the license plate number of cars owned or regis-
tered in their name, as well as any other information re-
quired by the Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
Investigation. The offender must periodically verify his ad-
dress. The frequency and duration of the verification de-
pends on the offender's classification: sexually oriented of-
fenders must verify annually for 10 years, habitual sexual of-
fenders must verify annually for 20 years, and sexual preda-
tors must verify every 90 days for life. The registration provi-
sion applies (no matter the date of offense) (1) if the offend-
er was released from confinement on or after July 1, 1997, 
(2) if the offender was sentenced on or after July 1, 1997, or 
(3) if immediately prior to July 1, 1997, the offender was 
classified as a habitual sex offender. 
The revised law also contained a community notification 
provision, something not in the former statute. The provi-
sion requires the county sheriff to notify certain community 
members, law enforcement agencies, officials responsible 
for the safety of children, and some victims of the offender's 
place of residence. The community notification provision 
applies no matter when the offense was committed. 
In State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570 
(1998), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the retroactive 
aspects of the new law. Cook was indicted on two counts of 
gross sexual imposition on November 14, 1996; he pled 
guilty to one count and the other was dismissed. The sen-
tencing hearing was held on February 14, 1997, during 
which time the trial court found Cook to be a sexual preda-
tor. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the sex of-
fender registration statute violated the Ohio Constitution's 
ban on retroactive laws, since Cook's conduct occurred 
prior to the statute's effective date of January 1 , 1997. The 
Supreme Court disagreed. In deciding that the statute did 
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States 
and Ohio Constitutions, the Court first determined that the 
General Assembly specifically intended the law to be 
retroactive. This determination was necessary because 
R.C. 1.48 provides that a "statute is presumed to be 
prospective in its operation unless expressly made retro-
spective." 
The Court then considered whether the statute was sub-
stantive or remedial, since under Van Fossen v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988), re-
medial statutes do not violate the Ohio Constitution, even if 
retroactive. The Court held that R.C. 2950 was remedial, as 
most of the provisions require action by law enforcement of-
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ficials and courts, not the offender. Since habitual sex of-
fenders were required to register under the old law, the 
statute could not be classified as imposing additional bur-
dens. The new law did change the frequency and duration 
of registration, and it changed the classification of offenders 
from one (habitual sex offender) to three (sexually-oriented 
offender, habitual sex offender, and sexual predator). 
However, these changes were considered to be "de minimis 
procedural requirements that are necessary to achieve the 
goals of R.C. Chapter 2950." 83 Ohio St.3d at 412. The 
Court referred to Doe v. Poritz 142 N.J. 1, 13-14 662 A.2d 
367 (1995), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, 
Had the Legislature chosen to exempt previously-convict-
ed offenders, the notification provision of the law would 
have provided absolutely no protection whatsoever on 
the day it became law, for it would have applied to no 
one. The Legislature concluded that there was no justifi-
cation for protecting only children of the future from the 
risk of reoffense by future offenders, and not today's chil-
dren from the risk of reoffense by previously-convicted of-
fenders. 
As to the new community notification requirements, the 
Court held that they were also remedial. The notification re-
quirements do not infringe on any substantive right of the of-
fender, since convictions are public records and since the 
burden is placed on the sheriff, not the offender. The Court 
did acknowledge the damage to the offender's reputation, 
but pointed out that any consequences of notification are 
"not as a direct result of the sexual offender law, but instead 
as a direct societal consequence of [the offender's] past ac-
tions." I d. at 412 (quoting State v. Butler, App. No. CA97 -03-
060, unreported, 1997 WL 786216 (1997)). 
After making the substantive-remedial determination, the 
Court turned to whether the statute is civil or criminal. This 
. determination is important, because the federal Ex Post 
Facto Clause applies only to criminal laws. The Court first 
looked to the General Assembly's intent, deciding that the 
statutory language demonstrated a remedial purpose, to 
promote public safety, as opposed to a punitive purpose. 
The Court next looked to whether the effect of the statute 
was remedial or punitive. In doing so, the Court considered 
the elements in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
144, 168-69 (1963): 
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding 
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment- retribution and deterrence, 
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may ra-
tionally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it 
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned .... 
The Court first determined that, while registering may be 
inconvenient, it is not a disability or restraint. Historically, 
the Court noted, registration has been a "valid regulatory 
technique with a remedial purpose." 83 Ohio St.3d at 418. 
The Court also held that the registration and notification 
provisions protect the public and are not intended to be ret-
ributive or a deterrent. The Court pointed out that there may 
be some deterrent effect, but that in itself was not enough to 
make a statute punitive. Since the Court found the statute 
to be remedial, not punitive, it held that the statute did not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
See also State v. White, 131 Ohio App.3d 547, 590, 723 
N.E.2d 158 (1998)("Aithough the Cook court did not specifi-
cally address R.C. 2950.09(C), the rationale applied by the 
court in its determination that R.C. 2950.09(8) violates nei-
ther the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution nor the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution applies to R.C. 2950.09(C)."); State v. Lee, 128 
Ohio App.3d 710, 716 N.E.2d 751 (1998) (because the suc-
cessive burdens imposed by R.C. 2950 are nonpunitive, civil 
remedies, neither the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, nor Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution (prohibiting retroactive laws) is implicated). 
DNA DATABANKS 
The adoption of DNA database statutes in every state 
produced a flood of litigation concerning the ex post facto 
application of such provisions. Although each state legis-
lates the conditions under which DNA samples are taken, 
the FBI has established a national databank system, called 
COOlS (Combined DNA Index System), into which the state 
profiles can be entered. Now states can search the data-
bases of other states. 
Non-Penal Purpose 
Some courts have ruled that the ex post facto prohibition 
does not apply because databanking statutes are not penal 
in nature. For example, the Ninth Circuit rejected such a 
challenge to the Oregon statute because its "obvious pur-
pose is to create a DNA data bank to assist in the identifica-
tion, arrest, and prosecution of criminals, not to punish con-
victed murderers and sexual offenders:· Rise v. Oregon, 59 
F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.1160 
(1996). Accord Shafferv. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1182 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (Because the "statutes have a legitimate, non-
penal legislative purpose, they do not run afoul of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause under these circumstances."), cert. de-
nied, 525 U.S. 1005 (1998); Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 
239 (7th Cir. 1995)("The blood specimen statute thus does 
not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause:'); Jones v. Murray, 
962 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 1992)("[A] statute that is not 
penal cannot be ex post facto. Thus it cannot be said that 
the DNA testing, itself, runs afoul of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause."). 
The ex post facto issue, however, does not necessarily 
disappear merely by labeling a statute as "non-penal." Ex 
post facto principles apply when punishment is retroactively 
increased, and that may occur if a sanction for refusal to 
provide a DNA sample is the denial of parole or the forfei-
ture of good time credits. Much depends on how a parole or 
good time statute is written. 
Parole 
If parole is purely discretionary, a parole board may con-
sider a refusal to comply with a valid prison regulation, 
such as one requiring a DNA sample, in determining the ap-
propriateness of parole. In contrast, an increase in the 
length of a sentence caused by new conditions in a manda-
tory parole jurisdiction is suspect. For example, the Virginia 
parole statute mandated parole six months before the sen-
tence release date, and the Fourth Circuit ruled that with-
holding release for failure to provide DNA samples would be 
unconstitutional. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 31 0 (4th Cir. 
1992)("[T]he continued incarceration beyond a time six 
months prior to the end of the actual sentence of an inmate 
convicted prior to the enactment of [the statute] for any rea-
son not reflected in the terms of the mandatory parole provi-
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sian, would constitute a retroactive extension of the inmate's 
sentence which is prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause."). 
Good-Time Credit 
Reduction of good-time credit raises somewhat different 
issues. In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981 ), the 
Supreme Court ruled that the elimination of good time-credit 
constituted an increase in punishment because "a prisoner's 
eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor en-
tering into both the defendant's decision to plea bargain and 
the judge's calculation of the sentence to be imposed." 
Weaver, however, involved inmates whose good-time 
credit was legislatively reduced across the board, even if 
they had not violated any prison regulation. Several courts 
have distinguished databank statutes on this basis, finding 
that at the time of sentencing good-time credits were known 
to be contingent on compliance with legitimate prison regu-
lations and the nature of those regulations may be amended 
while the prisoner is serving penitentiary time. See Gilbert v. 
Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Disciplinary mea-
sures imposed on inmates for failing to obey orders ... do 
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."); Ewell v. Murray, 11 
F.3d 482, 486 (4th Cir. 1993)(Prison officials may, "consis-
tent with the Ex Post Facto Clause, reasonably increase the 
penalties for prospective violations by inmates of reason-
able prison regulations when the penalties may involve the 
loss of good conduct time credits."), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 
1111 (1994); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,309-10 (4th Cir. 
1992)('The Ex Post Facto Clause does not prevent prison 
administrators from adopting and enforcing reasonable reg-
ulations that are consistent with good prison administration, 
safety and efficiency. ... It is precisely because reasonable 
prison regulations, and subsequent punishment for infrac-
tions thereof, are contemplated as part of the sentence of 
every prisoner, that they do not constitute an additional pun-
ishment and are not classified as ex post facto. Moreover, 
since a prisoner's original sentence does not embrace a 
right to one set of regulations over another, reasonable 
amendments, too, fall within the anticipated sentence of 
every inmate."). 
